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NOTES
RETHINKING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LAW:
PRENATAL MALPRACTICE AND
FEMINIST THEORY
CAROLYN A. GOODZEIT*
The woman's body, with its potential for gestating, bringing forth
and nourishing new life, has been through the ages a field of contra-
dictions: a space invested with power, and an acute vulnerability
1
INTRODUCTION
To much of the legal community outside the circle of feminist dis-
course, feminist legal theory remains susceptible to misunderstanding
and skepticism. Feminist terminology may contribute to this unfortu-
nate situation.2 As a result, many legal scholars, professionals and stu-
dents have cautiously avoided association with this controversial
theoretical framework. 3 Despite the antagonism that the term "femi-
nist" tends to generate, feminist legal theory and methodology have
slowly been finding their way into the structure and development of
American law.4 This translation of feminist theory into practice has
not been limited to statutory changes and has gradually manifested
itself in recent common law developments aimed at incorporating wo-
men's perspectives into the law.'
* I wish to thank Professor Tracy Higgins of Fordham Law School for guidance
during the development of this Note.
1. Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution
102 (Tenth Anniversary ed. 1986) (1976).
2. Feminist legal discourse is notorious for such provocative terminology as hier-
archy, dominance, patriarchy and oppression. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying
text.
3. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
Legal Educ. 3, 3 (1988) [hereinafter Primer](lamenting the hostility feminists face and
the consequent distancing of many career women from feminist policy and practice);
Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 19 (1991) (hypothe-
sizing that the legal academy has remained skeptical about the value of feminist schol-
arship); see also The Feminist Minority, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1994, at A12 (citing a
magazine Gallup poll finding that only one in three American women considers her-
self a feminist).
4. For example, the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon has
been critical to the development of sexual harassment law and anti-pornography legis-
lation. See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and
Equality, 8 Harv. Women's LJ. 1, 24-28 (1985) (proposing a model anti-pornography
civil rights law); see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993) (discuss-
ing both pornography and sexual harassment in terms of their discrimination against
women and their First Amendment protection).
5. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Part of the problem of institutionalizing feminist ideology is a gen-
eral unawareness of what the basic feminist theories entail. At the
most fundamental level, feminist legal theory is a critical analysis of
the current legal system, its laws and procedures, that assesses the
ways in which women's points of view and moral understandings have
been excluded from the shaping and development of the law.6 As
such, a "feminist perspective considers the significance of ideas about
gender in shaping institutions such as law, and the relevance of the
often overlooked or ignored experiences of women as powerful
sources of critical insight."'7 Thus, the central focus of feminist legal
theory is analyzing the numerous ways, both subtle and obvious, that
women's interests have been undermined within the law.
Aside from the analytical goals of feminist theory in understanding
the how and why of women's subordination, feminist scholars have
been even more challenged by the need to find practical methods of
redefining the existing power structure.8 Dissension among feminist
scholars has heightened this challenge. 9 Despite conflicting visions of
6. Feminist legal theory is distinguished from other legal theories such as Critical
Legal Studies because feminism takes gender as its central category of analysis.
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617, 617-18 (1990).
7. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 41, 42 n.1 (1989) [hereinafter Torts Course].
8. The existing power structure is often referred to in feminist discourse as patri-
archy, which Leslie Bender defines as the feminist term for "the ubiquitous phenome-
non of male domination and hierarchy." Primer, supra note 3, at 5-6. All feminist
theorists share the underlying goal of eradicating the socially and economically infer-
ior position of women. Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature
of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, Review Essay, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev.
352, 353 (1988).
9. Although feminists agree that the structures and stereotypes that exist in cur-
rent society oppress women, they intensely disagree over what the "feminine voice"
truly constitutes. For example, Professor Catharine MacKinnon is the most vocal
scholar from the "dominance" school which urges that women, because of their abso-
lute history of dominance by men, have no authentic voice with which to articulate
their needs. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on
Life and Law 39 (1987) (stating that "[w]omen think in relational terms because our
existence is defined in relation to men... [and] when you are powerless, you don't
just speak differently... you don't speak."). Consequently, a woman's perspective
cannot be infused into law until the social structures that oppress women are neutral-
ized. See id. at 40 (arguing that difference is a result of male dominance which has
socially constructed a hierarchy of power in which women are subordinate to men).
At the other end of the spectrum is the work of Carol Gilligan, who has produced
psychological studies of male and female children which suggest that women do in-
deed have a different method of moral reasoning than do males, and thus women are
essentially different from men. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychologi-
cal Theory and Women's Development 29 (1982). This understanding is often re-
ferred to as essentialism, authenticity or difference. Gilligan's work has become
popularly accepted among feminists and is the backbone of the difference school of
feminist thought. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 28(1988) (characterizing cultural feminism as the "official text" of feminism).
The heated debate between MacKinnon and Gilligan over whether the feminine
voice is innate or socially constructed is exemplified by this conversation the two
scholars had in 1984:
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how to confront patriarchy, however, feminist theory can be practi-
cally applied to the law. As Ruth Colker noted, "we cannot always
reduce the tension between opposing feminist positions by searching
for middle grounds; instead, we can reduce the tension by making dif-
ficult choices in particular historical circumstances but articulating, as
we make these choices, that the opposing perspectives represent im-
portant values and that our choices must be constantly open to re-
examination."'"
The perspective embraced in this Note reflects in large part the
claim of many feminists that women share a common set of female
values and aspirations grounded both in their experiences as mothers
and in their efforts to reclaim for women the "right to define what
'women' are and should be."" 'This view of feminism, often called
relational or difference feminism,' 2 can have direct implications for
the development of tort law.' 3 Because tort law encompasses value-
based concepts such as duty, reasonableness and harm, 4 feminist
scholars argue that tort law should be reconsidered and take into ac-
count women's points of view.' 5 Specifically, by re-evaluating duty
MacKinnon: And I am trying to work out how to change [the current
power structure], not just how to make people be more
fully human within it.
Gilligan: Your definition of power is his definition.
MacKinnon: That is because the society is that way, it operates on his
definition, and I am trying to change it.
Gilligan: To have her definition come in?
MacKinnon: That would be part of it, but more to have a definition that
she would articulate that she cannot now, because his foot
is on her throat.
Gilligan: She's saying it.
MacKinnon: I know, but she is articulating the feminine. And you are
calling it hers. That's what I find infuriating.
Gilligan: No, I am saying she is articulating a set of values which are
very positive.
MacKinnon: Right, and I am saying they are feminine. And calling them
hers is infuriating to me because we have never had the
power to develop what ours really would be.
Feminist Discours Moral Values, and the Law: A Conversation, 34 Buff. L Rev. 11,
74-75 (1985).
10. Ruth Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth and Lies, 99 Yale LJ.
1159, 1161 (1990) (reviewing Zillah Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law
(1988)).
11. Karen Offen, Feminism and Sexual Difference in Historical Perspective, in The-
oretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference 13 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
12. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
13. "Tort law cries out for feminist insights, methodologies, critiques, and recon-
structions. Because tort law is mostly common law.., it is flexible enough to respond
quickly to feminism's critiques." Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Schol-
arship, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 575, 575 (1993) [hereinafter Overview].
14. See Torts Course, supra note 7, at 42.
15. The "woman's point of view" for purposes of this Note will stem from the
work of relational feminists such as Carol Gilligan. See infra notes 174-79 and accom-
panying text. Relational feminists do not claim that this point of view is strictly asso-
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and harm, a feminist perspective can be infused into tort law in a fash-
ion that will give a "balanced legal consciousness informed by the per-
spective of both genders.' 6
Integrating feminist theory into tort law does not conclude with a
reconsideration of traditional tort concepts. Tort law frequently in-
volves issues, such as pregnancy, that are of central concern to wo-
men.'7 Therefore, when both traditional torts concepts and pregnancy
coincide within a single tort, feminist legal theory can supply a vast
array of critiques and suggestions for change. This collision is evident
in a series of cases that involve recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress for the stillbirth or injury of fetuses as a result of
prenatal medical malpractice.
The prenatal malpractice/emotional distress cases are an important
area of tort law for feminist reconsideration for a number of reasons.
First, these cases demonstrate the difficulties the courts face in coping
with the issue of pregnancy and the question of whether the fetus is a
separate entity from its mother."8 Second, this is one of the few com-
mon law areas where feminist theory has already had an impact. 19 Fi-
nally, the traditional analyses of negligent infliction of emotional
distress have presented many obstacles to mothers who seek recovery
for the emotional trauma resulting from the death or injury of their
fetus.2°
ciated with biological gender. Rather, as Gilligan noted, "[t]he voice I describe is
characterized not by gender but theme." Gilligan, supra note 9, at 2.
16. Torts Course, supra note 7, at 42.
17. A number of torts specifically implicate pregnancy. See infra part III.A.1.
18. See infra part II.
19. In particular, a New York trial court's decision in Alberto v. Columbia Presby-
terian Medical Center, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1993) shows how feminist insight can influence how judges view the law. Justice Kris-
tin Booth Glen's judgment addressed specific feminist concepts and concerns and re-
lied on such noted feminist scholars as: Robin West, Wendy Williams, Herma Hill
Kay, Isabel Marcus, Barbara Katz Rothman, Patricia Cooney, Linda Krieger, and Zil-
lah Eisenstein. See id. at 22.
20. See infra part II. This Note focuses solely on the availability of recovery for
mothers for emotional distress sustained from the stillbirth or serious injury of the
fetus. The right of the fathers to recover, however, has also been a somewhat contro-
versial issue for the courts. Compare Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 134-36 (Cal.
1977) (denying father's recovery for emotional shock even though father was present
in the delivery room and witnessed the emergency procedures performed on the dying
mother and fetus) with Austin v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 152 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422
(Ct. App. 1979) (allowing father to state a valid cause of action for emotional distress
when the father alleged that he learned of the death of the fetus by his own observa-
tion and "that his shock and distress were occasioned by that sensory and contempo-
raneous realization of the death"); compare also Robbins v. Kass, 516 N.E.2d 1023,
1026 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (denying father recovery for emotional distress because he
was never in any physical danger himself in witnessing the stillbirth of his child) with
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 919 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding that father's emotional distress was neither too remote nor un-
foreseeable for purposes of emotional distress recovery).
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The basis for the confusion in these cases derives from three pri-
mary conceptual difficulties. First, tort law is replete with conflicting
rules regarding the status of the fetus.21 The ambiguity as to whether
a fetus is a part of its mother or separate from her has resulted in
tremendous contradiction among the courts.' Second, the tort princi-
ples behind negligent infliction of emotional distress were not
designed to address prenatal malpractice. Rather, emotional distress
doctrine developed at common law to meet specific circumstances,
such as when fright induced mental trauma, or when a parent wit-
nessed injury to his or her child.3 Consequently, the prenatal mal-
practice cases do not fit comfortably within the established legal
formulas. Finally, women have been unable to recover in many in-
stances because of the restrictive nature of tort law itself. The con-
cepts of duty and harm have been traditionally very limited,24 and as a
result, courts have been unwilling to afford recovery in these
circumstances.
This Note serves a twofold purpose. First, it underscores the cur-
rent difficulty in applying traditional tort law concepts to cases of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress where pregnancy is a principal
factor. Second, it addresses the ways in which feminist legal theory
should be applied to resolve the conceptual challenges the courts have
faced in deciding these difficult cases. Part I of this Note provides an
overview of negligent infliction of emotional distress doctrine and the
traditional analytical frameworks courts use to assess these causes of
action. Part II explores how these rules and frameworks have been
applied to prenatal medical malpractice claims and highlights the con-
flicting results the courts have reached and the obstacles women face
in seeking recovery. Part III offers a feminist critique of this area of
the law and interprets the erratic results in these cases. Finally, this
Note concludes that a new approach should be adopted in analyzing
these cases to recognize the complexities of the maternal/fetal rela-
tionship and to redefine the existing concepts of duty and harm to
reflect feminist ideals.
21. See discussion infra part III.A.1.
22. Compare, eg., Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 418 N.E.2d 386, 386 (N.Y. 1980)
(holding that harm caused to a fetus in utero by the defendant does not impose a duty
on the doctor towards the mother) with Anisodon v. Superior Ct., 285 Cal. Rptr. 539,
546 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that duty during prenatal care includes the mother). For
a discussion of the difficulties pregnancy creates within the law, see generally Zillah
Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law 98 (1988) ("The pregnant body represents
a dilemma for legal discourse.").
23. Martha Chamallas with Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright:
A History, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814, 814 (1990).
24. See infra part IH.C.
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I. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIsTREss: A
CONCEPTUAL BACKDROP
Traditionally, negligence law only allowed compensation for physi-
cal and property damage. 25 Compensation for emotional harm was
and continues to be much more limited for a number of policy rea-
sons. For instance, emotional suffering is generally viewed as a tem-
porary condition and can be easily feigned or imagined.26 Courts also
tend to perceive an unfairness in imposing heavy financial burdens for
behavior causing physical consequences that are considered remote
from the "wrongful" act.27 Moreover, the specter of increased litiga-
tion affects the courts' willingness to allow recovery. 28 As a result, the
avenues of recovery for emotional injuries are limited.
There are three basic categories of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. First, under the direct victim framework, a plaintiff may re-
cover for emotional distress if she has suffered a direct physical harm
from the defendant's negligent act which leads to emotional distress.29
Second, under bystander analysis, a plaintiff may recover if she is a
witness to an injury to a family member that causes her to suffer her
own emotional distress.30 Finally, under a duty framework, a plaintiff
may recover if the defendant has breached a direct duty that is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress.31 To state a
cause of action in any of these cases, however, many states require
that the plaintiff prove some physical manifestations of the distress to
ensure that the emotional injuries are genuine.32 Because of the diffi-
25. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at
359-60 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton].
26. See id. § 54, at 360-61.
27. See id.
28. Id. This is also known as the classic floodgate argument.
29. Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?,
67 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1992). The requirement of physical impact has been virtually
extinguished, and today, even the mildest form of impact can be sufficient to trigger a
cause of action. Id. at 8; see also Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 363-64
(listing some absurd situations where courts have found "impact").
30. Davies, supra note 29, at 7-8.
31. Jacqueline M. Mega, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Confusion in
New York and a Proposed Standard, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 379, 381 (1990). The classic
example of this form of negligent infliction of emotional distress appears in Battalla v.
New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961), in which a ski-lift attendant negligently failed
to secure the safety bar and plaintiff subsequently suffered severe emotional trauma.
Id. at 729.
32. See, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (adopting
the physical manifestations requirement in order for bystanders to recover for emo-
tional distress); Robbins v. Kass, 516 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (stating
that this requirement indicates a desire to permit compensation only in severe emo-
tional distress cases); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., 365
S.E.2d 909, 916 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted) (commenting that absent any
physical impact, plaintiff must prove some resulting physical injury from the emo-
tional distress).
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culty of distinguishing mental from physical injuries, others merely re-
quire that the distress be sufficiently severe to ensure genuineness. 3
Courts that require physical manifestations of the distress only rec-
ognize several exceptions to this requirement. First, the physical
trauma rule does not adhere in cases that involve negligently deliv-
ered messages erroneously informing the plaintiff that a loved one has
died.-' In addition, plaintiffs need not plead physical harm if a de-
fendant has negligently handled the remains of a loved one (the
"corpse" cases).35 Recently, the New York courts have also allowed
recovery without showing physical manifestations of distress when the
negligent advice of a defendant leads a plaintiff to violate her deep-
seated beliefs and undergo an abortion. 6 In these three circum-
stances, the courts eliminated the physical manifestation requirement
because of the unique guarantee that the emotional harm was real.37
Physical manifestations of emotional distress are also required
under many bystander frameworks. Generally, courts employ one of
three basic bystander analyses. Traditionally, bystanders to another's
injury had to prove that they suffered some sort of physical impact in
addition to physical injuries resulting from the distress.38 This rule,
however, has been discarded in most jurisdictions. 39 Although in-
dependent injury will still afford relief in the courts, a number of other
states also allow recovery if plaintiffs can satisfy the "zone of danger"
test for their emotional distress.' This test allows a bystander to re-
cover when: (1) the defendant's negligence creates an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries; (3) that resulted
from the contemporaneous observance of death or physical injury; (4)
to a member of the plaintiff's immediate family; (5) in the plaintiff's
33. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 364-65 n.57-9. Hawaii, Califor-
nia and several other states allow recovery for emotional distress without regard to
any physical manifestations of the trauma. Id.
34. Mega, supra note 31, at 383. A popular example of this form of the tort ap-
pears in Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975), in which a hospital erro-
neously informed the plaintiff-daughter that her mother had died. l at 590.
35. See Mega, supra note 31, at 383; see also Prosser & Keeton, supra, note 25,
§ 54, at 362; see, e.g., Lando v. New York, 351 N.E.2d 426,427 (N.Y. 1976) (allowing
recovery when defendants did not recover the body of plaintiff's daughter for eleven
days).
36. Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538, 539
(N.Y. 1987). See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
37. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 362.
38. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 362; Blanche Wilkinson, Note, By-
stander Emotional Distress Claims in Medical Malpractice Actions, 15 Am. 1. Trial
Advoc. 605, 608 (1992).
39. This rule only persists in Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Oklahoma and Oregon. Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 608 n.19.
40. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 365.
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presence.4' The majority of jurisdictions, however, follow California's
Dillon rule.4" Under Dillon, the plaintiff (1) must be in close proxim-
ity to accident; (2) must suffer a direct emotional impact from the con-
temporaneous observance of the accident; and (3) must be closely
related to the victim.4 3 Recently, this rule has been modified to stress
the foreseeability of emotional harm as a determining factor."
Several jurisdictions have eliminated the physical manifestation re-
quirement for bystanders 45 If plaintiffs are not required to allege
physical consequences of their distress, they must at least prove that
they suffered severe emotional distress. Ty pically, the severity is as-
sessed in terms of the intensity and duration of the distress. 6 Somejurisdictions have formulated specific tests to determine the extent of
the emotional harm. New Jersey, for example, applies a three factor
test: (1) the frequency of the distress; (2) the length or intensity of the
distress; and (3) the interference caused by the distress in everyday
life.
47
When these forms and analyses of negligent infliction of emotional
distress are applied in the context of prenatal malpractice, they be-
come convoluted and unworkable. The case law demonstrates that as
applied to a physician's negligence causing the severe injury or death
of the fetus, neither bystander, direct victim nor duty analysis provide
a sound and legitimate avenue of recovery for mothers for their result-
ing emotional distress.
41. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (I11. 1983); Bovsun v.
Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. 1984). In Illinois, a plaintiff seeking damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress must allege not only that she was in a zone of
physical danger and reasonably feared for her safety but also that she suffered physi-
cal manifestations of her emotional distress. Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324, 1327(Ill. App. 1987). This rule is also followed in North Carolina. See Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 916 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that absent some impact, a plaintiff must show some physical injuries resulting from
her distress).
42. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). States adhering to the Dillon rule
include: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 614 n.66.
43. Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 614-15.
44. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
45. Maine and New Jersey do not require physical manifestations of emotional
distress in order for bystanders to recover. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at
365 n.60.
46. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
47. Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 864-65 (N.J. 1988); see
also Andreasen v. Gomes, 504 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Neb. 1993) (stating that "It]o be
actionable, the emotional distress must have been so severe that no reasonable person
could have been expected to endure it").
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II. PRENATAL MALPRACTICE AND EMOTIONAL DisrREss:
INCONSISTENCY AND CONFUSION IN THE COURTS
When a doctor's negligence physically injures only the fetus, and
leaves the mother with severe emotional scars, the courts have been
unable to fit this unique form of emotional harm into either by-
stander, direct victim or duty frameworks. As a result, many courts
have used a complicated array of tortured logic and legal fictions, and
have offered sharp criticisms of other courts' analyses.48 While one
court may assess the cause of action under the bystander theory, an-
other may resort to direct duty analysis. Others may opt to treat the
mother and fetus as one, so that the mother is the direct victim of the
negligent conduct. In some cases, the court may not select the frame-
work at all and instead rely on the plaintiff's pleadings.4 9 Conse-
quently, the case law manifests an inconsistent pattern of adjudication,
in which courts waver between treating the mother as a bystander, the
direct victim of the harm, or an object of duty.
A. Mother as Bystander
Although none of the three prevailing emotional distress formulas
have provided uniform and positive results for mothers, many courts
across the country have analyzed cases of prenatal malpractice under
a bystander framework. Courts applying this analysis have depended
largely on the assumption that two entities are involved in the equa-
tion.50 Accordingly, mothers must prove such factors as their obser-
vance of the injury to the fetus, their risk of serious bodily injury or
their own independent physical injuries, despite the fact that the pro-
cedure that caused the harm was performed through contact with her
body.
1. The "Contemporaneous Observance" Pitfall
Both the Dillon and zone of danger tests require that the plaintiff
"contemporaneously observe" the death or injury of a family member
48. See, e.g., Sceusa v. Mastor, 525 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (4th Dep't 1988) (criticizing
the use of bystander analyses in prenatal malpractice contexts because bystander
analysis was created as a fiction "in order to bring the plaintiffs within the tort-fea-
sor's ambit of duty/foreseeability ... [and this] fiction is unnecessary... where de-
fendants doctor and hospital clearly had a duty to both the mother and the unborn
infants and the risk of injury as a result of defendants' negligence was foreseeable").
49. See, e.g., Anisodon v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (Ct. App. 1991)(mother bases her action for emotional distress on her status as the physician's patient
for her pregnancy and delivery); Hurlbut v. Sonora Comm. Hosp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 840,
843 (Ct. App. 1989) (parents base their emotional distress claims solely on the "by-
stander" theory and did not contend that they were direct victims of the breach of
duty.).
50. See, e.g., Khan v. Hip Hosp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 706 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1985) ("The mother's biological contribution from conception on is nourishment and
protection; but the foetus has become a separate organism and remains so throughout
its life.") (citing Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953))).
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to state a prima facie cause of action.51 In the context of prenatal
malpractice, however, the ramifications of the negligence may not be-
come apparent until after the child is born. 52 For example, if the doc-
tor negligently performs a procedure and directly harms the fetus, the
mother may not become aware that the injury has occurred until the
fetus is born and the harm is observable. Likewise, if a doctor negli-
gently fails to perform certain tests or procedures that could have pre-
vented harm to the fetus, the harm may become apparent at a much
later time than when the negligent omission took place. In both situa-
tions, the nexus between the negligent act or omission and the
mother's realization of it are remote. As a result, from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, the courts have disagreed on how to interpret the obser-
vance factor in a way that accurately reflects the realities of prenatal
care and childbirth.
Whether or not a mother is deemed to have "contemporaneously
observed" the death or injury to the fetus may hinge solely on the
specific facts of the case. Under the zone of danger test, for instance,
the New York Court of Appeals in Tebbutt v. Viroste0 3 denied a
mother emotional distress recovery for the stillbirth of her fetus after
her physician negligently performed an amniocentesis. Because she
did not become aware of the injury to the fetus until weeks later when
she gave birth,54 the court found that she had not observed the injury
to the fetus and denied recovery.55 The temporal nexus between the
injury and the mother's realization of it was critical to this decision.
In contrast to Tebbutt, a New York trial court found only months
earlier in Khan v. Hip Hospital56 that under certain circumstances, a
mother could "contemporaneously observe" the injury or death of the
fetus. 57 In Khan, the plaintiff mother was awake and conscious and
subject to a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury during a
prolonged delivery, in which the physician failed to perform a timely
cesarean.58 After being anesthetized, the mother regained conscious-
51. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
52. For example, in Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985), a mother
was negligently administered an amniocentesis which later led to the stillbirth of the
baby. Id. at 1143.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1143.
55. Id. Thus, because she failed to satisfy the zone of danger observance require-
ment, she had to prove that she had sufficient independent physical injuries to war-
rant recovery. The court then found that her "pain, severe disappointment, anxiety,
despondency, bitterness and suffering" were not sufficient physical injuries to main-
tain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
For a discussion of what constitutes sufficient independent physical injury to main-
tain a cause of action for emotional distress, see infra part II.A.3.
56. 487 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985).
57. Id. at 706.
58. The plaintiffs alleged in particular that the defendants were guilty of malprac-
tice in "failing to properly anticipate a footling breech delivery and provide compe-
tent physicians to deal with an emergency created at the time of birth." Id. at 701.
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ness and immediately became aware that the fetus was stillborn, only
a short time after its actual occurrence.59 Moreover, Mrs. Khan's first
request was to see her baby, at which time she was taken in a wheel-
chair to the hospital's morgue." In reaching its decision, the court
found that "contemporaneousness should not require that plaintiff
witness the impact."' 61 Accordingly, when the injury occurred during
the delivery of the infant, and not weeks earlier, the temporal nexus
was met. The court held, therefore, that if the evidence substantiated
her claims, the mother could recover under the zone of danger test.62
Parallel conflicts arise under the Dillon observance requirement.
Although the Dillon test is often regarded as the most liberal of the
bystander frameworks, 63 courts interpreting the observance require-
ment have been reluctant to expand it to cover situations where the
mother did not become aware of the injury until some time after the
injury. For example, in Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital,' the
California Court of Appeals found that Dillon did not afford recovery
to a mother for emotional suffering caused by the birth of her infant
with brain damage, unless she suffered her own independent injury.'
The court reasoned that the mother could not have contemporane-
ously observed the injury to the fetus because she was unconscious
during delivery.66 Consequently, the court found that Dillon did not
allow recovery when parents do not become aware of the negligence
until after the fact,6 7 even though the negligent conduct occurred dur-
ing the delivery process.68
Other courts have addressed the observance requirement by simply
redefining the contemporaneity factor in factual situations involving
prenatal care and the delivery of infants. For example, in Phillips v.
59. IL
60. 1&
61. Id.
62. Id. at 707. The Khan court based this holding on the observance analysis
enunciated in Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982), discussed infra notes
73-76 and accompanying text.
63. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 366 (stating that the restrictive
zone of danger test has been discarded in some jurisdictions in favor of the progres-
sive "bystander proximity" doctrine).
64. 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id. at 844.
66. See id. at 844-45.
67. Id. at 843-44. In most cases of prenatal malpractice, the parents do not be-
come aware of the injury to the fetus until well after the negligent procedure has
taken place. Therefore, confining Dillon to actual observance of the negligent act
severely limits a mother or father's ability to recover for the emotional trauma caused
by the resulting injury to the infant. But see Sesma v. Cueto, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15 (Ct.
App. 1982) (finding that a mother's perception of and concern over the neglect she
was experiencing from medical personnel in the labor room could constitute contem-
poraneous observance and afford recovery for emotional distress).
68. The parents had brought suit against the hospital for damages resulting from
the physician's failure to perform a timely cesarean section, which caused brain dam-
age in the infant. 254 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
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Cooper OB/GYN Associates,69 the court applying New Jersey law7"
found that in the context of childbirth and pregnancy, the heightened
observance requirement of immediately witnessing the accident did
not apply.7' The district court relied on an earlier New Jersey decision
which found that "the experience of pregnancy and child birth itself
constitutes the immediacy and presence of the claimant in the face of
inflicted personal injury or death of a loved one."7
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar interpretation in Haught v.
Maceluch73 and construed Dillon to allow a mother to recover for her
emotional distress by finding that she had contemporaneously ob-
served the injury to her fetus. The "contemporaneous" requirement
under Dillon was considered to include the mother's "experiential
perception" of the entire accident, not just the moment of injury.74
The court also found that regardless of whether the mother actually
witnessed the injury to the fetus, the factor of observance should not
determine the outcome.75 Instead, the clear foreseeability of the
mother's distress in the context of childbirth overrode the weakness of
any one factor.76
As a consequence of these decisions, to satisfy the "contemporane-
ous observance" factor of bystander theory, mothers must allege and
69. 811 F. Supp. 1018 (D.N.J. 1992). In Phillips, the plaintiff's son suffered head
bruises and chest contusions during delivery as a result of the physician's alleged mal-
practice which caused permanent damage to the infant's left shoulder, left arm, and
left hand. Id. at 1019. The plaintiffs, the infant's mother and father, presented evi-
dence that the father was present in the delivery room with his wife during the child-
birth and that they both witnessed the injuries to the infant contemporaneously with
his birth. Id. at 1020.
70. New Jersey follows a similar test to Dillon and requires a plaintiff to prove (1)
the death or serious physical injury of another caused by the defendant's negligence;
(2) a marital or intimate familial relationship between plaintiff and the injured person;
(3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) resulting
severe emotional distress. Portee v. Jaffe, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
71. Phillips, 811 F. Supp. at 1023.
72. Id. (quoting Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 142-43 (N.J. 1988)). The Phil-
lips court also noted that the temporal nexus between the observance of the injury
and the emotional distress that was required in order to recover for bystander emo-
tional distress differed in the context of negligent medical diagnosis versus negligent
medical treatment. In Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989), the New Jersey
Supreme Court imposed a heightened standard for satisfying the observance require-
ment in cases of medical misdiagnosis. The Frame court ruled that because of the
unique circumstances of medical misdiagnosis in which parents do not perceive the
consequences of the negligence until after the fact, a temporal nexus was required
between the misdiagnosis and the injury, as well as the contemporaneous observation
of the injury by the family member. Id. at 678-79. This heightened requirement
should not be imposed where negligent prenatal and childbirth procedures leads di-
rectly and imminently to the injury of the fetus. See Phillips, 811 F. Supp. at 1023.
73. 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982). In Haught, the physician's negligence and ab-
sence during the mother's difficult delivery caused the infant to suffer permanent
brain damage. Id. at 294-95.
74. Id. at 300 (quoting Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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prove that the injury to the fetus was caused during delivery and that
she was conscious and aware of the injuries. The observance require-
ment, therefore, can be a substantial obstacle to mothers seeking emo-
tional distress recovery. These inconsistencies are not restricted to
interpreting the observance requirement, and also appear when courts
have assessed other elements of bystander recovery.
2. The Zone of Danger Requirement
In zone of danger jurisdictions, a mother must also prove that she
was in immediate physical danger from the defendant's negligence.'
In the context of prenatal care, this element is not satisfied merely
because the conduct that caused the injury to the fetus occurred
through contact with the mother's body.7" For instance, Tebbutt found
that the negligent performance of an amniocentesis did not draw a
mother into the zone of danger.79
Other courts have analyzed the zone of danger more broadly. In
Brown v. Green,"0 for example, when a defendant physician's negli-
gence caused the premature birth and subsequent death of the plain-
tiff's pre-viable twins, the court allowed the mother to recover."' The
court reasoned that the miscarriage of a fetus that has not reached
viability is considered physical injury to the mother that puts her in
the zone of danger.' 2 Regardless of this expansive view, the zone of
danger continues to be an obstacle to mothers seeking recovery when
they do not allege independent physical injury.83
77. See Seef v. Sutkus, 562 N.E.2d 606, 609 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that plain-
tiffs must suffer a reasonable fear for their own safety, not simply fear for the safety of
a third person); Guialdo v. Allen, 567 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (1st Dep't 1991) (finding that
the law is established that a plaintiff may not recover for injury resulting from witness-
ing the unintentional infliction of harm to another unless the negligence of the de-
fendant also created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff and the
emotional disturbance experienced was "serious and verifiable"); Khan v. Hip Hosp.,
487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 705 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) ("According to [the] Bovsun-
Vaillancourt analysis, the plaintiff mother need not prove 'independent physical inju-
ries' but may recover for emotional and psychic harm as a result of the stillborn birth
if she is found to have been within the 'zone of danger' and subject to a reasonable
fear of immediate personal injury.").
78. See Seef v. Sutkus, 562 N.E.2d 606, 609 (App. Ct. 1990) (stating that "[p]arents
of an unborn child are not ipso facto in the zone of danger for negligence involving
that child").
79. See supra note 53-55 and accompanying text.
80. 781 F. Supp. 36 (D.D.C. 1991).
81. See id. at 39.
82. Id. The court did not fully explain this point, so it remains unclear if the court
considered the mother the direct victim of the conduct or if she was still a bystander
even though the fetus was not viable. Because the court did use a bystander analysis,
however, it seems to have implicitly regarded the mother as a third party.
83. See, e.g., Seef v. Sutkus, 562 N.E.2d 606, 609 (II. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that
mother who perceived changes in the responses of her fetus while waiting to undergo
cesarean section was not within the zone of danger).
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3. The Independent Injury Factor
When a court finds that a plaintiff has not observed the injury to a
third person or was not in the zone of danger, it then requires the
plaintiff to prove that she suffered her own independent injury.84
These injuries must be completely distinct from the pain and suffering
associated with the childbirth process or the injury to the fetus. 85 This
rule is grounded in policy considerations to keep tort concepts man-
ageable and limited.86
Independent injury is generally a question of fact for the courts,
requiring case-by-case determinations. 87 For example, courts have
disagreed on whether a cesarean section constitutes an injury suffi-
cient to meet this requirement. In Alberto v. Columbia Presbyterian
84. If the mother is not in the zone of danger, however, she may not recover for
emotional harm as a result of a stillbirth absent physical injuries to the mother distinct
from the injuries to the fetus. Scott v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, 594
N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (3d Dep't 1993); Bubendey v. Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 543 N.Y.S.2d
146, 147 (2d Dep't 1989); Burgess v. Miller, 508 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (2d Dep't 1986);
Gastwirth v. Rosenberg, 499 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (2d Dep't 1986).
The same rule also prevails in North Carolina. In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and
Gynecology Assocs., the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that a mother must
show some impact if she was not in the zone of danger. 365 S.E.2d 909, 916 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988). Given the physical connection between mother and fetus, however, the
court found that a physical impact or injury to the fetus is an injury or impact to the
mother. Id. at 917.
The independent injury requirement also attaches if the Dillon factors are not met.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
85. See Wittrock v. Maimonides Medical Ctr., 501 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (2d Dep't
1986) (finding that plaintiff's labor pains were not actionable independent injuries
because they were incident to the childbirth process); Farago v. Shulman, 480
N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (2d Dep't 1984) (finding that plaintiff's episiotomy was merely an-
other aspect of the childbirth procedure and not an independent injury and did not
cause the stillbirth of plaintiff's infant); McLean v. Lilling, 529 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (finding that in order for mother of stillborn child to
successfully plead an "independent physical injury, the injuries must be other than
those attendant to childbirth and must be a cause of the stillbirth").
86. Sceusa v. Mastor, 525 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (4th Dep't 1988).
87. Courts have found no independent injury to the mother in the following cases:
Scott v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, 594 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (3d Dep't 1993)
(finding that plaintiff's rapid heartbeat, nausea, shortness of breath and chest pains
were a result of the fetal distress and thus were not independent injuries); Guialdo v.
Allen, 567 N.Y.S.2d 255,256 (1st Dep't 1991) (finding that plaintiff's lower abdominal
cramping during last six weeks of pregnancy was not independent of childbirth pro-
cess); Hayes v. Record, 551 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (3d Dep't 1990) (stating that plaintiff's
"anxiety attacks" do not meet the independent injury requirement "even under the
most liberal pleading standards"); Keselman v. Kingsboro Medical Group, 548
N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (2d Dep't 1989) (finding that mother's moderate vaginal bleeding
was a common phenomenon during childbirth and not an independent injury); Bauch
v. Verrilli, 536 N.Y.S.2d 240,242 (3d Dep't 1989) (holding that an episiotomy does not
constitute physical injury unless it is also alleged to be the cause of the infant's death).
But see Stiles v. Sen, 544 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (4th Dep't 1989) (holding that whether a
torn cervix or vaginal tear is an independent injury is an issue of fact for the trial
court).
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Medical Center,"' the court found that a cesarean section was a physi-
cal injury to the mother which placed her in the zone of danger.s9 The
Alberto court suggested that if Mrs. Alberto had delivered vaginally,
she could not have recovered because she would have no independent
injury.9' Other courts, however, have found that cesarean sections are
routine delivery procedures and do not constitute independent inju-
ries for the purposes of negligent infliction of emotional distress
recovery. 91
Courts have also found independent physical injury where the
mother was conscious during a long and painful delivery,' where the
mother suffered for hours while waiting for the doctor to perform a
cesarean section,93 and where the mother was seeking an abortion.94
To survive summary judgment, therefore, it is imperative for a plaintiff
to plead some form of physical injury.95 The injury claimed, however,
88. N.Y. LJ., Sept. 10, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993). This case in-
volved the defendant physician's negligent amniocentesis, which resulted in an emer-
gency cesarean section. A week after the surgery, the infant died. See id.
89. Id.; see also Zinn v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 476 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (2d
Dep't 1984) (affirming denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment because
plaintiff, who underwent an emergency cesarean section in which the fetus died, al-
leged "physical injuries").
90. Alberto, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 10, 1993, at 22.
91. Sceusa v. Mastor, 525 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (4th Dep't 1988) (finding that plain-
tiff's cesarean section did not fall within the realm of physical injury); McLean v.
Lilling, 529 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (finding that "the caesa-
rean itself was another aspect of the childbirth procedure and thus cannot serve as the
basis for recovery"). On the subject of cesarean sections in the context of medical
malpractice, see generally Hilary E. Berkman, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice
and Cesarean Section, 70 Or. L. Rev. 629, 649-50 (1991) (arguing that a decrease in
the number of cesareans performed will allow women to have greater control over
their bodies and will force physicians to focus on the woman's needs in each particular
case).
92. See, eg., Khan v. Hip Hosp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 704 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1985) (finding that delayed and prolonged delivery was not merely an incidental as-
pect of the childbirth process). But see Bubendey v. Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 543
N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (2d Dep't 1989) (finding that labor pains for many hours are
neither independent of those naturally associated with the childbirth process itself nor
the cause of the injury to the fetus); Prado v. Catholic Medical Ctr., 536 N.Y.S.2d 474,
475 (2d Dep't 1988) (finding that plaintiff's claim of "prolonged pain cannot be ac-
tionable since it was not permanent and since it could be considered as pain naturally
associated with the childbirth process itself").
93. McLean v. Lilling, 529 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988).
94. In Ferrara v. Bernstein, 582 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dep't 1992), for example, the
New York Appellate Division found independent physical injuries in the abortion
context. Id at 676-77. In Ferrara, plaintiff's abortion was incomplete and several
weeks later, after suffering through severe cramping, she was admitted to the hospital
where she miscarried a four and one-half inch fetus into a toilet. Id. at 674-75. The
court distinguished the abortion context from injuries arising from a stillbirth, noting
that while the physical pains she suffered might be naturally associated with child-
birth, they were not naturally associated with the abortion procedure for which she
had contracted. Id. at 676.
95. See, e.g., Friedman v. Meyer, 454 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910 (2d Dep't 1982) (holding
that plaintiff cannot recover without showing independent physical injuries).
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must be independent and not incidental to the childbirth process and
unrelated to the stillbirth or fetal injury.96
4. The Severity of the Distress
Another element which may preclude emotional distress recovery is
the seriousness of the distress itself. Although a particular jurisdiction
may or may not require the trauma to take a physical form,97 mothers
have the additional task of proving severe emotional distress.
In zone of danger jurisdictions, the physical manifestations rule re-
quires that the mother show that her mental distress has resulted in
physical symptoms.98 For example, crying, sleeplessness, increased
migraine headaches and becoming upset upon the sight of other preg-
nant women does not rise to this standard.99 Seeking medical atten-
tion, however, may be a step towards documenting physical
manifestations.1 "
In Dillon jurisdictions, the absence of the zone of danger require-
ment seems to facilitate recovery. Because courts do not have to fo-
cus on whether the parents were themselves at risk, they are free to
assess the core issue: the severity of the emotional distress and
whether it should be compensated. This severity may be assessed by
looking at the facts and circumstances of the underlying injury. In the
context of childbirth and pregnancy, some courts deem these special
circumstances to ensure the genuineness of the emotional distress. 10 1
Others have stricter requirements. 10 2
5. The Bystander Morass
The case law demonstrates the difficulties in applying bystander
frameworks to the prenatal malpractice context. Whether the court is
employing the Dillon test, with its requirement of contemporaneous
observance, or invoking the zone of danger test and searching for in-
dependent physical injury, neither analysis comprehends pregnancy in
a manner that accounts for the emotional and physical connection be-
tween mother and fetus.'0 3 Furthermore, using a bystander analysis is
96. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
98. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983).
99. See Robbins v. Kass, 516 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cooper OB/GYN Assocs., 811 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (D.N.J.
1993) (holding that "the parents' experience of observing the injury of their child
during childbirth as a result of medical negligence is one that gives rise to genuine
claims of psychic injury").
102. See Andreasen v. Gomes, 504 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Neb. 1993) (stating that
"[m]ere crying, mourning and headaches" is not sufficient emotional distress to war-
rant recovery).
103. In one extreme case, a court imposed a further burden on the mother to re-
cover under the zone of danger test. In McBride v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Ctr.,
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erroneous because it applies to situations where two individuals are
involved, and during pregnancy, the law is clear that only one individ-
ual exists."° In light of this analysis, many courts have analyzed the
prenatal malpractice cases by treating the fetus and mother as a single
entity, thus designating the mother as the direct victim of the malprac-
tice and injury.
B. The Mother as Direct Victim
Several jurisdictions have discarded bystander analysis and allowed
mothers to assert causes of action for emotional distress arising from
the stillbirth of their infants as part of their direct malpractice
claims.1"5 These decisions reflect in part a recognition that bystander
analysis is inappropriate in these situations) °e
Courts have chosen to employ the direct victim approach for vari-
ous reasons. Some courts opt for this analysis because they recognize
the physical connection between mother and fetus. 7 Others have
498 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986), the court held that being within the
zone of danger standing alone does not create liability:
To hold that the zone-of-danger rule applies would be to determine that a
fetus is a "member of the immediate family." [But] as far as tort law is
concerned, a fetus has no "life" until birth. It follows that someone who was
never alive could not be considered a member of the family and could not be
within the zone of danger.
Id at 262. But see Kahn v. Hip Hosp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 706 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1985) (finding that for purposes of the zone of danger test, a stillborn fetus is
a member of the immediate family).
104. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 158 (1973) (holding that a fetus is not a
person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
105. Currently decisions in California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Texas and
Virginia have reflected this approach. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr.
63, 65 (Ct. App. 1981); Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847, 847-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Gendek v. Poblete, 636 A.2d 113, 117 (NJ. App. Div. 1993); Johnson v. Verrilli,
511 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (Sup. Ct. Duchess County 1987); Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839
S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); and Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233,236 (Va.
1986).
106. In Johnson v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1981), the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals remarked that medically caused stillbirth did not fit in the
Dillon mold. Id. at 65. As the court went on to note, "[t]he solution to the problem
lies not in contorting Dillon to cover a situation which it was not designed to fit, but in
recognizing that the emotional distress arising from the sensory impact of the death of
the child is compensable as part of the mother's cause of action for malpractice to
herself." Id. See also Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (I1. Ct. App. 1987)
(remarking that cases involving stillbirth as a result of medical malpractice do not fall
into the zone-of-physical-danger rule as contemplated by the court, but failing to offer
an alternative framework); Sceusa v. Mastor, 525 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (4th Dep't 1988)
(criticizing application of the zone of danger rule in cases seeking damages for emo-
tional distress resulting from the stillbirth of an infant).
107. See, eg., Sesma v. Cueto, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15 n.2 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding it
unreasonable to label a woman a bystander as to any injury suffered by her fetus,
considering the intimate and psychic connection between them); Johnson v. Superior
Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing that a mother forms a close
relationship with her fetus during pregnancy so that the emotional trauma from its
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elected this approach as a practical matter because fetuses are not
considered persons under the state's wrongful death statute,10 8
The direct victim approach is the most realistic in the sense that it
recognizes the physical connection between mother and fetus. The
mother's claim is therefore a primary claim on her behalf and in rec-
ognition of her injuries, as opposed to a derivative injury on behalf of
the fetus.10 9
Regardless of the appeal of this approach and its practical ease in
application, wide acceptance of it may not be forthcoming given the
moral and theoretical difficulties of treating fetal tissue like any other
part of a woman's physiology. 110 In addition, treating the fetal tissue
as simply another part of the woman's body may unrealistically under-
value women's claims of emotional distress."' Like bystander recov-
ery, therefore, direct victim analysis suffers from theoretical
weaknesses regarding the status of the fetus. Moreover, courts that
use direct victim logic are directly contradicting courts that use by-
stander analyses in how they treat the fetus. In an attempt to over-
come these problems, therefore, a number of courts have tried to
stillbirth is foreseeable harm to the mother); Gendek v. Poblete, 636 A.2d 113, 117
(N.J. App. Div. 1993) (stating that the basis for the direct victim rule is the "essential
identity of mother and fetus" such that the commission of malpractice on one was the
commission of malpractice on the other); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that "[a]s the fetus is
normally attached to the mother's uterine wall, [the court fails] to see how a physical
impact or injury to the fetus would not normally be an injury or impact to the
mother").
108. See, e.g., Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847, 847-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
("The Florida Supreme Court has held that, in legal contemplation, an unborn fetus is
not a person for the wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for
damages under [Florida's wrongful death statute], therefore it is living tissue of the
body of the mother for the negligent or intentional tortious injury to which the
mother has a legal cause of action the same as she has for a wrongful injury to any
other part of her body.") (citations omitted); Johnson v. Verrilli, 511 N.Y.S.2d 1008,
1010 (Sup. Ct. Duchess County 1987) (finding that because the fetus is not a person to
whom a cause of action accrues, it must be regarded as part of the mother's body);
Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992) (treating the mother
as the direct victim because Texas law does not treat the fetus as a separate entity);
Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236 (Va. 1986) (affirming the trial court's determi-
nation that the mother sustained a direct injury because an unborn child is not a
"person" within the meaning of Virginia's wrongful death statute). This rationale was
also asserted by Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals in her dissent in
Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985): "Where the law declares that a
stillborn child is not a person who can bring suit, then it must follow in the eyes of the
law that any injury here was done to the mother." Id. at 1149 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
For more detailed discussion of Tebbutt, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
109. See Gendek v. Poblete, 636 A.2d 113, 117 (N.J. App. Div. 1993) (commenting
on the direct victim analysis employed in Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279 (N.J. 1993)).
110. See, e.g., Alberto v. Columbia Presbyterian Hosp., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1993, at
22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (discarding the notion that the mother is the sole
victim of the negligence because of the fetus' "potentiality of life").
111. See infra part III.C.1.
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assess these claims in terms of the physician's duty to the mother and
fetus.
C. Duty to the Mother
A final approach to the prenatal malpractice cases is to assess the
cause of action for emotional distress in terms of breach of duty.112
Much like the direct victim approach, courts favor a duty analysis be-
cause bystander frameworks do not accurately reflect the reality of
prenatal care." 3 Duty analysis, however, suffers from the same diffi-
cult determinations of whether one or two entities are implicated in
the recovery equation. This problem arises in duty analysis because a
court must determine to whom the harm is foreseeable," 4 and thus
implicitly determine whether or not it considers the fetus an in-
dependent entity. If the court does determine that the duty was owed
to the fetus, the mother must comply with bystander requirements in
order to recover.
In cases of emotional distress arising from the death or injury of a
fetus, courts have rarely assessed the standard of care owed to the
mother and fetus. Rather, they have focused solely on whether the
physician owes a duty of care at all to the mother when it harms the
fetus within her. The question for the courts, therefore, has been pri-
marily to whom the duty runs.
If the physician's duty only runs to the individual to whom the neg-
ligent conduct is directed, it seems on the surface that there is a bright
line distinction between mother and child. In the context of preg-
nancy, however, this line is not so clearly drawn. On the contrary, it is
often extremely ambiguous as to whom the conduct was directed dur-
ing pregnancy. Consequently, assessing to whom the duty flows may
depend merely on the judge's interpretation of the negligent act, or
how the judge characterizes fetal life at the time of the injury. This
point is highlighted by contrasting duty analysis for emotional distress
claims arising in two recurring fact patterns that involve pregnancy.
First, in the context of prenatal care, where the mother is anticipating
the birth of the child, courts have struggled with the question of to
whom the duty flows. Second, in the context of abortion, where the
mother wishes to terminate the pregnancy, duty is focused solely to-
wards the mother.
112. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Bernstein, 582 N.Y.S.2d 673, 679 (1st Dep't 1992) (Murphy,
J., concurring) (distinguishing cases where mother sues for emotional injuries sus-
tained as a result of an incomplete abortion as cases of breach of direct duty and not
bystander cases where mother fears for fetuses' injuries); Sceusa v. Mastor, 525
N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (4th Dep't 1988) (stating that bystander analysis is a "fiction [that]
is unnecessary and inappropriate in a case such as that before us where defendants
doctor and hospital clearly had a duty to both the mother and the unborn infants and
the risk of injury as a result of defendants' negligence was foreseeable").
114. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 43, at 280.
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1. Duty in the Context of Prenatal Care
Contrary to what may be generally assumed, courts have found that
the doctor's care does not run to both mother and fetus during prena-
tal care. In most cases, courts impose duty on the defendant only
when they can reasonably anticipate harm towards the plaintiff.11 5
Hence, when a physician performs a procedure on a fetus during the
course of prenatal care, such as an amniocentesis, the only foreseeable
harm may be to the fetus, and not to the mother.116 When the negli-
gent procedure in turn causes injury or death to the fetus, the physi-
cian has only breached her duty to the unborn infant." 7
This line of reasoning was invoked by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Tebbutt v. Virostek" 8 when it rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the defendant doctor had breached his duty to the mother.19
The court based this decision on a prior New York ruling in Vaccaro v.
Squibb Corporation,20 which held that harm caused to a fetus in utero
by the defendant, about which the mother does not learn until after
the stillbirth, does not impose a duty on the defendant towards the
mother.
In contrast to Tebbutt, courts in California have employed a more
realistic notion of duty when a mother undergoes prenatal care. For
instance, in Anisodon v. Superior Court,12 the court found that duty
during prenatal care runs the mother as well as the fetus, deeming
them a family unit which received joint treatment.2 2 Moreover, in
Burgess v. Superior Court,'23 the California Supreme Court recog-
nized that a duty does exists towards the mother because of the pre-
existing physician-patient relationship with the mother during child-
birth, and because any treatment for the fetus can only be achieved
with the mother's consent and impact to her body.'24 Even in this
analysis, however, courts still distinguish mother and fetus, and assess
115. Id. § 54, at 359.
116. For example, see the Tebbutt decision discussed supra notes 53-55 and accom-
panying text.
117. See Scott v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, 594 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (3d
Dep't 1993) (finding that no recovery can be allowed when the injuries alleged by the
mother were caused by a breach of a claimed duty to the fetus) (citing Woods v.
Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (N.Y. 1951) (holding that there is no recovery for prepar-
turn injuries to a fetus unless the child is delivered alive))).
118. 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985).
119. Id. at 1143.
120. Id. at 1143 (citing Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1978)).
121. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Ct. App. 1991).
122. Id. at 546.
123. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
124. Id. at 1202-03.
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whether or not the tort was directed towards the mother or the
fetus.'
Other courts have grounded their duty analysis in contract theory.
For example, in Newton v. Kaiser Hospital,126 the California Court of
Appeals found that the physician-patient relationship created a duty
to both mother and father because the plaintiffs had contracted with
the hospital to provide for the treatment and delivery of a healthy
child. 2 7 Other courts have also used contract theory to recognize a
cause of action for the mental anguish associated with the stillbirth of
a fetus as a result of medical malpractice. In Taylor v. Baptist Medical
Center,"z the Alabama Supreme Court opined that upon evidence of
an implied contract, the mother of a stillborn fetus may recover for
emotional distress that resulted from the breach of the doctor's duty
of care.
2. Duty in the Context of Abortion and Wrongful Birth
When the medical treatment a pregnant woman seeks is to obtain
an abortion, and not to receive prenatal care, the issue of duty and to
whom it flows is less controversial. In the abortion context, women
assert emotional distress claims arising from three primary fact pat-
terns: (1) when a physician negligently performs an abortion on a
pregnant woman; (2) when a physician gives her false information that
leads her to terminate the pregnancy; or (3) when a physician fails to
give her necessary information to make the choice to terminate her
pregnancy. Under these circumstances, courts invariably view the
duty to run to the mother, and then focus on the scope of the physi-
cian's standard of care and whether it has been breached.
When the doctor negligently performs an incomplete abortion, and
the surviving fetus later dies from injuries sustained as a result, the
courts have allowed the mother to recover for her emotional distress.
For example, in Miller v. Johnson,12 9 the Virginia Supreme Court
stated that "[u]nder traditional tort principles, it is clear that a physi-
cian who performs an abortion or sterilization procedure owes a legal
duty to the patient. Where the patient can establish failure to perform
the procedure with reasonable care and damages proximately result-
ing from breach of the duty, she is entitled to recover as in any other
medical malpractice action."1 30
125. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1993)(stating
that California courts remain reluctant to find a duty and allow recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress arising from injuries to fetuses as third parties).
126. 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App. 1986).
127. Id. at 894.
128. 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981).
129. 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986).
130. Id. at 304; see also Ferrara v. Bernstein, 582 N.Y.S.2d 673, 678 (1st Dep't 1992)
(finding that defendant's failure to inform plaintiff that her abortion was unsuccessful
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When a doctor gives incorrect information that leads a mother to
abort her fetus, the courts have also allowed recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. For example, in Martinez v. Long Is-
land Jewish Hillside Medical Center,13 1 a pregnant woman was negli-
gently advised by her physician that her baby would be born with
birth defects and that she should abort the fetus.' 32 The plaintiff acted
on such advice, only to find out that the baby would have been born
healthy. 33 The court found that the doctor's affirmative advice to the
mother was the precipitating and proximate cause of her emotional
distress, and that she could recover.' 34 The tortious conduct in this
case was regarded as the advice to undergo an abortion, which clearly
was directed at the mother. Because the court did not consider the
status of the fetus at all in this context, the court's interpretation disre-
gards the fact that the initial negligence occurred when the doctor mis-
diagnosed the fetus' health, a procedure ostensibly performed on the
fetus.
Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates135 so-
lidified the removal of the fetus as a consideration in duty analysis in
the context of abortion. In Lynch, the defendant had prescribed
Provera to the plaintiff to induce menstruation, assuring her she was
not pregnant. 36 The plaintiff later learned that she was pregnant, and
that Provera was known to cause birth defects if ingested during preg-
nancy.' 37 Fearing the effects of the Provera, the plaintiff and her hus-
band opted to terminate the pregnancy, causing the mother to suffer
in time for her to undergo a second abortion stated a prima facie case of negligence
for resulting emotional distress).
131. 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987).
132. Id. at 538.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 539. This case is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the
court allowed the recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress regardless of
the fact that the plaintiff-mother manifested no physical symptoms of her trauma. As
Judge Titone suggested in his dissent, this holding thus creates a new form of emo-
tional distress in addition to the "corpse" and "death message" cases already existing
in tort doctrine. See id. (Titone, J., dissenting). Second, the injury to the fetus (its
death) was not the event that the court found elicited the distress. Instead, the court
found that Mrs. Martinez's distress resulted from her breaching her deep-seated reli-
gious conviction against abortion. Id. The injury to the fetus was regarded as an
indirect, albeit intended, result of the breach. Id.
The courts have interpreted this new cause of action quite narrowly. In Lancellotti
v. Howard, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1989), for example, the Appellate Division
denied a woman recovery for her emotional distress arising because her physician
erroneously informed her she was pregnant and continued to treat her as such for
seven months. Id. at 655. The court found that unless the plaintiff showed some phys-
ical manifestations of her distress, she could not recover. Id. Recovery for purely
emotional harm, therefore, is premised on a breach of duty owed directly to the plain-
tiff, which either endangered her physical safety or caused her to fear for her own
safety. Id.
135. 532 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. 1988).
136. Id. at 1240.
137. Id.
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severe mental anguish. 138 The court allowed the mother to recover
for her emotional distress, even without a showing of physical mani-
festations, finding that her emotional injury arose from direct harms
to herself in undergoing the abortion, not from the loss of the fetus. 139
In other contexts involving abortion, however, the availability of
emotional distress recovery is less certain. When a physician fails to
give advice to the mother regarding certain risks inherent in her preg-
nancy, for example, the ability to recover for emotional harm is less
likely. Courts have conflicted on whether the breach of a duty to in-
form a mother of the risks of her pregnancy will give rise to a cause of
action for emotional distress. In Richardson v. Rohrbaugh,4 ' the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals denied parents recovery for emotional distress
because of their doctor's failure to perform genetic testing on their
first child, which later led them to conceive a second infant who was
born with birth defects identical to the first.' 4' The court reasoned
that no duty of care arose towards the physician for the first preg-
nancy to prevent the birth of the second child because no physician-
patient relationship existed at the time of the second pregnancy.'42 If
the mother had pursued a claim against her physician during the pre-
natal care of the second infant, however, she might have been able to
state a viable cause of action. For example, in Karlsons v. Guerinot,4 3
the New York Appellate Division recognized a duty on the part of the
physician to properly diagnose the condition of the fetus allowing the
parents to make the decision whether to abort.'
Regardless of whether a court recognizes a duty flowing to both
parents and child, however, recovery for emotional harm may be dis-
carded for other reasons. In Becker v. Schwartz 45 for example, the
New York Court of Appeals found that the calculation of damages for
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1241.
140. 857 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
141. Id- at 419. The plaintiff mother gave birth to a severely retarded son who
continued to receive neurological treatment from the defendant doctor. The doctor
never advised the mother or father of any risks in conceiving a second retarded child,
despite plaintiffs' consistent questions and concerns. Several years later, the mother
conceived and gave birth to a daughter, suffering from the identical conditions as her
brother. The plaintiffs then alleged that the doctor's negligence denied them the right
to choose whether to conceive the daughter and resulted in her conception and their
emotional trauma. Id. at 417.
142. See id. at 418.
143. 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (4th Dep't 1977).
144. Id. at 936. In factual circumstances very similar to Miller, the mother had al-
ready given birth to one child with birth defects and once pregnant with the second
child, was never advised of the risks of her pregnancy, nor offered an amniocentesis
despite her age. Id. at 934. The second child was also born a mongoloid, at which
time the parents sued the defendant doctor, alleging they would have terminated the
pregnancy had the proper tests been done. Id. Unlike Miller, however, they asserted
their claim against the obstetrician for the prenatal care of the second infant.
145. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
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emotional distress from the birth of a deformed infant was too specu-
lative to assess, despite the existence of a duty to the parents.14
6
The net result of the confusion regarding duty is that mothers of
stillborn or birth-defected infants are often precluded from obtaining
compensation for their emotional suffering. In the context of prenatal
care, courts have tended to distinguish to whom the duty of care is
owed because of implicit determinations that the fetus is a separate
life. In the context of abortion, however, analysis has focused primar-
ily on the harm suffered by the mother that arises from the breach of
duty. The explanation for this problem and for the difficulties the
courts have faced lies in the inability of courts to effectively confront
the pregnancy question. The solution rests in the insights of feminist
legal theorists, who have proposed conceptual frameworks for re-
thinking pregnancy, duty and harm in the law.
III. CREATING A MOTHER/FETUS NExus: FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY AND TORT LAW
To provide a sense of legitimacy and fairness to these cases, a
framework should be created that considers the underlying restrictive
policies of emotional distress recovery, yet also includes an under-
standing of pregnancy and tort law that incorporates a woman's per-
spective. In the past, the courts have failed to meet this challenge
because of the conceptual difficulties they face over the pregnancy
question, the unsuitable frameworks that exist within contemporary
emotional distress doctrines and the limited concepts of harm and
duty that persist in tort law.
A. Overcoming the Pregnancy Dilemma in Tort Law
Bystander, direct victim and duty analyses present difficulties to the
courts primarily because of the ambiguous relationship between
mother and fetus. Under the current frameworks, courts must make
an assumption on how to treat the fetus, as either a part of the family,
or as part of the mother. This all-or-nothing approach has created
many of the difficulties in applying the law of emotional distress.
Consequently, the first challenge to reforming emotional distress doc-
trine in the context of prenatal care lies with reassessing pregnancy
and turning away from the tortured constructions courts have used in
the past to characterize the relationship between mother and fetus.
146. Id. at 814. The court noted, however, that part of this decision rested on the
fact that there were mitigating factors because the infant was in fact born alive and
"parents may yet experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully dampen."
Id. The court declined to rule on whether recovery for emotional damages would be
allowed if the fetus was stillborn as a result of malpractice.
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1. Perspectives on Pregnancy in Prenatal Torts
The difficulty courts have faced in assessing the maternal/fetal rela-
tionship is not unique to emotional distress cases.1 47 Tort law is re-
plete with conflicting characterizations of the fetus and thus offers
little guidance to focus any reform in emotional distress law.
Although tort law purports to have resolved the question of whether a
fetus is accorded a legal status separate from its mother, 148 a survey of
the prenatal doctrines shows otherwise.
There are two basic classifications of prenatal injuries: (1) when a
defendant inflicts a physical injury, through the body of the mother,
upon an unborn child, and (2) when a defendant's tortious act or
omission results in the birth of an unwanted child. 149 The first cate-
gory of prenatal torts includes wrongful death 15 and maternal negli-
gence.151 The second group consists of causes of action for wrongful
life,'52 wrongful birth,15 3 wrongful conception,54 wrongful diagno-
sis' 55 and preconception torts.' 56 Depending on the jurisdiction, the
fetus in these cases may or may not be treated as a separate legal
entity.
Wrongful death is the clearest example in the first category of pre-
natal torts of how courts have contradicted each other regarding the
status of the fetus. For instance, some states require that the fetus first
must be born alive before parents may recover for wrongful death."s
147. The fetus has been accorded legal status in equity, criminal law, property law
and tort law. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 367-68. The fetus does not
have a legal status in constitutional law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
See also Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience:' Forsaking A Duty of
Care to her Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 Brook. L Rev. 807, 810 (1987)
(showing that the status of the fetus is not treated uniformly in all areas of the law).
148. "[A] stillborn fetus has no legally protected status as far as the law of torts is
concerned since such law does not recognize it as a human being." McBride v. Brook-
dale Hosp. Medical Ctr., 498 N.Y.S.2d 256, 260 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986).
149. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 367. For a summary of birth-related
torts, see 3 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law- Liability and Litigation,
§ 31.01-31.16, at 85-119 (rev. ed. 1988).
150. Although there is no common law cause of action for wrongful death, all states
have enacted wrongful death statutes which usually provide that the action can be
maintained for "any wrongful act, neglect, or default" which causes death. Prosser &
Keeton, supra note 25, § 127, at 945-46; see infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
153. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
154. Some courts allow plaintiffs to state a valid cause of action for wrongful con-
ception when a parent has undergone an unsuccessful surgical birth control procedure
and seeks damages for the expenses of rearing an unplanned child. Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978).
155. Wrongful diagnosis arises when parents seek damages for the birth of a child
after a physician has failed to inform the parents of possible complications in time to
terminate the pregnancy. See id. at 811.
156. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 132 (Cal. 1977) (finding that the
word "person" does not include the unborn under California's wrongful death stat-
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The majority of states, however, have allowed parents to recover for
wrongful death even when a fetus is miscarried or stillborn. 15 8 These
jurisdictions are therefore implicitly finding that the fetus is a "per-
son" within the meaning of those states' wrongful death statutes. 159
This presumption may be closely linked with the viability of the fetus
at the time of the death. 6 ' The disagreement among courts whether a
fetus is a person under the wrongful death statute may also directly
conflict with other prenatal torts. In New York, for example, the
courts treat the mother as a bystander to prenatal injuries, which im-
plies the fetus is a separate entity, yet they do not allow parents to
recover for the wrongful death of a fetus because it is not a person.
Mothers are then precluded from recovering under either claim.1 61
The status of the fetus is also unclear in cases where the mother
herself inflicts the physical injury on the fetus. Although infants have
generally been precluded from asserting claims against their mothers
for negligent infliction of prenatal injuries through drug or alcohol
ute); Henderson v. North, 545 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
Florida does not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus);
Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236 (Va. 1986) (stating that the law in Virginia is
established that an unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the state
wrongful death statute). For these states, the viability of the fetus at the time of injury
is irrelevant. See Abdelaziz v. AMISUB of Florida, 515 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that the wrongful death of a fetus, regardless of viability, is not a
cognizable cause of action).
158. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 370.
159. See, e.g., Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15, 20 (D.C. 1993) (hold-
ing that a viable fetus is a person with a right of action in D.C.'s survival statute); see
also Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1148 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting)
(listing 28 states that allowed wrongful death recovery for the death of a fetus as of
1985).
The problem with this determination is the explicit contradiction to Roe v. Wade's
holding that a fetus is not a person. See 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). Thus, "a seeming
paradox exists: the law permits the imposition of liability for fetal death or injury
negligently caused, but on the other hand, also permits immunity from liability for
harm intentionally caused and maternally desired." David Kader, The Law of Tor-
tious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 639, 641 (1980). This reason
alone emphasizes the need to determine a consistent and desirable redefinition of the
legal status of the fetus.
160. See id.; see also Brown v. Green, 781 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding
that prior to viability, any injury to the fetus is an injury to the mother); Amadio v.
Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1086-87 (Pa. 1985) (holding that wrongful death actions lie for
fatal injuries received by fetuses while viable); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489,
495 (N.C. 1987) (same). The viability question is less important to the courts than the
live birth requirement, and courts have granted relief when the injury occurred before
viability when the mother was only in the early weeks of pregnancy. Prosser & Kee-
ton, supra note 25, § 55, at 368-69.
161. For example, in Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985), the court
precluded parents of a stillborn infant from recovering under New York's wrongful
death statute because the fetus was not a person, yet also denied recovery for emo-
tional distress because the mother could not satisfy the bystander elements of the
zone of danger test. As a result, the mother is rendered a "bystander to medical
procedures performed upon her own body." Id. at 1148 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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abuse, 6 z this rule does not require any determination as to the status
of the fetus.' 63 Rather, it is an outgrowth of social policy that prevents
courts from imposing a uniform standard of prenatal health care on
mothers of varying cultural backgrounds.' 6 '
The question of whether the fetus should be treated as a separate
entity from its mother is unclear in the second classification of prena-
tal tort as well. This category includes claims asserted by both the
fetus and the parents because the fetus is born alive. A severely in-
jured infant has several causes of action against negligent physicians,
including its own negligence claim.1 65 In a limited number of jurisdic-
tions, an infant may also sue for wrongful life. 66 The parents in these
situations may sue for the wrongful birth of an unwanted child. 67
162. Michigan is the only state to allow a child to recover against its mother for
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries on the basis of a "reasonable pregnant wo-
man" standard. Kahn, supra note 147, at 827-28.
163. The most notable case on this issue is Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355
(Ill. 1988), in which the court held that a woman's interest in privacy and bodily integ-
rity and difficulty of establishing a "reasonable" prenatal care standard militated
against recognizing a fetus' right to sue its mother. Recent Cases, 103 Harv. L Rev.
806, 823 (1990). In addition, the fact that the fetus is physically part of its mother
mandates that a state exercise even greater caution in attempting to set minimum
standards of conduct, "lest it unduly infringe upon a pregnant woman's constitutional
right to exercise autonomy over her person." Kahn, supra note 147, at 815.
164. See Recent Cases, supra note 163, at 825.
165. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 368.
166. This situation arises when the doctor has negligently performed an incomplete
abortion or sterilization resulting in the birth of an infant with brain damage or some
other deformity. Many jurisdictions do not recognize this cause of action on the ra-
tionale that life, even if impaired, does not constitute a cognizable injury relative to
non-existence. See Lee & Lindahl, supra note 149, § 31.15, at 114; see, e.g., Robak v.
United States, 658 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that an action for wrongful
life does not exist in Alabama); Reed v. Campagnolo, 810 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Md.
1993) (stating that Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful life);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that "whether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a
mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians"). But cf
Gami v. Mullikan Med. Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 827 (Ct. App. 1993) (following a
California Supreme Court ruling that an impaired child may recover for wrongful
life).
167. These causes of action arise under similar circumstances as wrongful life
claims, but also include instances when a doctor fails to inform parents that their child
has birth defects in time to terminate the pregnancy. The claim may also be cogniza-
ble if the infant is born healthy. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 372.
Historically, these causes of action did not exist because of conflicts with anti-abortion
statutes. For example, in Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981), a
pregnant woman's physician failed to inform her that her rubella could cause brain
damage in her fetus. Although abortion was illegal in Alabama in 1972 when the
negligent conduct occurred, the court found that it could benefit from the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973, and granted the plaintiff recovery
for wrongful birth. Id. at 473-75. Today, many jurisdictions recognize the right of
parents to recover for wrongful birth, including Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Vest Virginia
and Wisconsin. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 810 F. Supp. 167, 171 n.7 (D. Md. 1993).
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Currently, however, only a small number of courts have allowed an
infant to bring a claim for torts committed on the mother before the
child was conceived that resulted in some deformity or genetic de-
fect. 168 In each of these scenarios, courts have disregarded whether
the injury occurred either before or after viability, and have focused
instead on the fact that the infant was born alive. The only require-
ment of the fetus, therefore, is that there be life before a cause of
action accrues on its behalf.169 This category of tort, therefore, adds
little insight into how fetuses should be treated.
A survey of tort law thus suggests that whenever a fetus is brought
into the equation for recovery, difficulties arise with how to character-
ize its potential for life.170 Consequently, beyond the realm of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, there is no precise answer in tort
law as to how the maternal/fetal conflict should be resolved. Without
guidance from the prenatal torts, then, it appears that the concept of
pregnancy itself should be reconsidered within the law to provide a
more uniform approach than the ad hoc analyses currently in use.
One seemingly practical solution to the conflict between prenatal
tort and bystander characterizations of the fetus is to bind the status
of the fetus in the emotional distress analysis to the status used in the
underlying claim. For instance, if a doctor negligently performs an
amniocentesis that results in the stillbirth of the fetus, for purposes of
the plaintiff's wrongful death claim, the fetus is not a person. 17 1
Therefore, the fetus should not be considered a person in the plain-
tiff's emotional distress claims, such that the theoretical framework
does not treat the mother as a bystander, and complicated determina-
tions as to the zone of danger may be avoided. Likewise, if a scenario
The general rationale for allowing such recovery is that this type of emotional harm,
which extends to both parents, is a direct harm to the parents flowing from the de-
fendant's breach of duty to the parents. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936
(4th Dep't 1977).
168. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 55, at 369. The policy reasons advanced
for this rule are that such claims involve difficult problems of proof and proximate
causation arising, for example, from the imposition of liability upon a chemical or
drug for future generations of genetically mutated children. Id. This rule differs,
however, when the mother ingests the drug during her pregnancy (post-conception)
which results in birth-defects. In such cases, the infant may bring a cause of action
against the chemical manufacturer. For example, between the 1950s and 1970s, many
pregnant women were prescribed DES (diethylstilbestrol) to prevent miscarriages.
The children who were exposed to DES in utero later developed serious reproductive
tract injuries and cancer. Overview, supra note 13, at 587 n.52; see, e.g. Sindell v.
Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 935 (Cal. 1980) (discussing a market share theory for
allocating liability among the major manufacturers of DES).
169. See McBride v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Ctr., 498 N.Y.S.2d 256,259 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1986).
170. See Kahn, supra note 147, at 825 (finding that in tort law, a fetus does acquire
legal status, but this status only attaches if the fetus is born alive, or when the courts
have found it necessary to confer entitlements upon the fetus for the protection of the
life and health of the mother).
171. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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arises in the second category of prenatal torts, such as the birth of an
unwanted child, the fetus has become a person, so the mother then
must satisfy bystander requirements."7
This practical change alone, however, does not remedy the existing
maternal/fetal conflict within the law. First, logistical changes such as
this merely reshuffle existing concepts without infusing women's per-
spectives on the experience of pregnancy.173 Second, courts still must
make some type of determination regarding the status of the fetus,
lending itself to philosophical conflicts. To effectively cope with the
issue of pregnancy in prenatal malpractice, therefore, courts must
reconceptualize pregnancy from a feminist perspective, that accounts
for women's experiences during pregnancy and as mothers, rather
than the courts' interpretations of fetal life.
2. A Feminist Redefinition of Pregnancy
How courts characterize pregnancy in future emotional distress
cases should be informed by the experiences of women. The starting
point for this analysis must begin with looking beyond the physiologi-
cal aspects of the reproductive process, and must also focus on the
emotional, social and cultural meanings of pregnancy and childbirth.
Because pregnancy is a common experience shared by most women,
understanding how it should be characterized should include women's
perspectives. The first analytical step, therefore, is ascertaining what
different feminists suggest pregnancy means.
Some feminist theorists have suggested that women and men tend
to understand moral obligations differently, particularly in the context
of relationships. 174 These theorists argue that women tend to privilege
172. See, e.g. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-09 (N.Y. 1978) (plaintiffs
were never advised of the risk of Down's Syndrome to their infant and consequently
sued for wrongful life and emotional distress).
173. See infra part III.A.2.
174. Relational feminism stems in large part from the psychological studies pub-
lished by Professor Carol Gilligan which suggest that women subscribe to an ideal of
care by which women see and respond to need, taking care of the world by sustaining
"the web of connection." Gilligan, supra note 9, at 62. This ethic (termed the ethic of
care) differs from male moral reasoning, which perceives individuals as standing
alone, attached to a system of rules, rather than a system of relationships. See id. at
29. Because women are seen to respond to their relationships, feminist scholarship
that relies on this argument is frequently called relational feminism. Although rela-
tional feminism has been termed the "official" feminist legal theory, see Vest, supra
note 9, at 28, it has also been the focus of much criticism from other feminists. See,
e.g., Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism,
Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 858, 860 (1993)
(challenging the wide acceptance of relational feminism because it assumes the moral
reasoning described by Gilligan is authentic, and not just a result of female oppres-
sion); see also Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 373, 379 (1991) (stating that feminist insight does not reveal women's
"essence, but the structure of power under which they live"); MacKinnon, supra note
9, at 34 (criticizing the difference standard because masculinity remains as the critical
reference point).
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relationships and their connection to others, while men value individ-
ual autonomy and separation.'75 Taking this relational perspective
into account, pregnancy can be reconceptualized, focusing on the rela-
tionship between mother and fetus, not on the separation that will
occur after birth.
Emphasis on the relationship between mother and fetus, many fem-
inists urge, runs against the classic liberal legal tradition in which indi-
viduals are viewed in terms of their competing rights.'76 Under liberal
legal theory, the prototype of male legal reasoning,177 mother and fe-
tus are pitted against each other, each striving to preserve their own
rights. 78 The alternative approach, under a feminist jurisprudence,
would be to break down the barriers between mother and fetus and
assess the interests of both as connected to each other by their physi-
cal and emotional bonds.179
If mother and fetus are not autonomous individuals, the difficult
question arises of how to properly characterize their relationship in a
way that can effectively operate within the law to preserve women's
bodily autonomy and at the same time recognize the unique relation-
ship between mother and child during pregnancy. Courts assessing
emotional distress claims have tended to focus solely on the physio-
logical aspects of pregnancy such as viability'80 without regard to the
175. "Women are 'profoundly relational;' men are not. That, according to rela-
tional feminist theory... is the 'essential' difference between them." Karlan & Ortiz,
supra note 174, at 858. The male conceptual framework is termed the ethic of justice,
and is generally described in terms of separation, autonomy, individualism and inde-
pendence. See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1699, 1712-13 (1990) (offering a descriptive list of differences between the "ethic of
care" and the "ethic of justice").
176. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 543 (1986).
177. "Liberalism has been viewed as inextricably masculine in its model of sepa-
rate, atomistic, competing individuals establishing a legal system to pursue their own
interests and to protect them from others' interference with their rights to do so."
Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1171, 1173 (1992); see also id. at 1242 (defending
liberalism by analogizing the ethic of care to the notion of duties arising out of per-
sonhood, such that both ethics are directed at recognizing the relationships that exist
between individuals).
178. Id. at 1243. Under liberal and libertarian theories, emphasis on the basic
rights of individuals has presented a number of moral dilemmas for women. Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 75 (1989). Because liberal legal theory
has ignored the fact that the potential lives of fetuses are radically dependent upon
the bodies of others, conflicts have arisen between the rights of mothers to control
their bodies, particularly in the context of abortion, surrogate motherhood and mater-
nal drug use. See id.
179. See Martha Minow, Making All the Difference 194 (1990) (criticizing the au-
tonomous assumption of prevailing legal doctrine because it rests on an image of "in-
dependent man" rather than "interconnected woman").
180. See supra part II; see also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology As-
socs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that so long as mother and
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social and emotional experiences that occur during pregnancy."'1 In
this respect, the courts have ignored the fact that pregnancy has both
biological and social implications.'82
One way to confront this dilemma is the conceptualization pro-
posed by Justice Glen in her decision in Alberto v. Columbia Presbyte-
rian Medical Center."a Justice Glen suggests that rather than focusing
on "the either/or of the pregnant woman or fetus as object of injury,
the real focus should be on the pregnancy itself."' She characterizes
the pregnancy as an "ongoing process," which includes changes in
both the woman's body and the well-being of the fetus."a Moreover,
because this is a process that a woman has chosen to go through, neg-
ligence that injures the pregnancy violates the expected outcome of
the pregnancy.86 Thus, the injury or death of a fetus is not a self-
contained event, and causes physical and emotional injuries to the
mother as well.
Justice Glen's new framework for understanding pregnancy has
practical merits for the law and encompasses many prevailing feminist
theories. In a practical sense, Justice Glen recognizes in her analysis
that pregnancy must be characterized in a way that does not dismiss
the unique character of the fetus as something more than body tissue,
yet something less than an independent entity. In this sense, she rec-
ognizes the "potentiality of life" understanding of pregnancy."8
fetus are physically connected, the fetus is not "another" person for purposes of pre-
cluding emotional distress recovery).
181. But see Johnson v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1981) (rec-
ognizing that the emotional relationship a mother develops with her child during
pregnancy exists even while the child is still a fetus).
182. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abor-
tion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 267 (1992).
Professor Siegel also commented that:
Social forces play a powerful part in shaping the process of reproduction.
Social forces define the circumstances under which a woman conceives a
child, including how voluntary her participation in intercourse may be. So-
cial forces determine whether a woman has access to methods of preventing
and terminating a pregnancy, and whether it is acceptable for her to use
them. Social forces determine the quality of health care available to a wo-
man during pregnancy, and they determine whether a pregnant woman will
be able to support herself throughout the term of gestation, or instead will
be forced to depend on others for support. Social relations determine who
cares for a child once it is born, and what resources, rewards, and penalties
attend the work of gestating and nurturing human life.
Id
183. N.Y. L., Sept. 10, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
184. Id. at 22.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id Courts have attempted to define the "potentiality of life" by a two-
factor test: (1) whether the fetus is viable, and (2) what is the purpose of declaring the
fetus a person. Kahn, supra note 147, at 811.
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Recognizing that the fetus is more than the mother's body tissue
will help Justice Glen's conceptualization gain acceptance in the legal
community. Most legal scholars and courts would agree that the
mother and fetus are not completely separate entities from each
other.' As Ronald Dworkin noted, "it is as wrong to say that the
fetus is separate from [the mother] as to say that it is not."'1 9 There-
fore, if the fetus is not a person, it is at least "a creature of moral
consequence.' 190 In this way, fetal tissue is something more than just
body tissue of the mother that is damaged by prenatal malpractice.
The fetus is thus concurrently the "potentiality of life" and the
mother's tissue.' 91
This dual aspect of fetal tissue highlights the inappropriateness of
existing legal analyses of emotional distress claims. First, the direct
victim approach, which would negate any recognition of fetal life until
birth, is unrealistic. Likewise, bystander analysis is inappropriate be-
cause it accords the fetus complete autonomy. Similarly, duty analy-
sis, as it currently exists, also accords the fetus an independent status.
Thus, adopting a framework that focuses on the pregnancy and con-
nection, rather than the separation, necessarily rejects these
approaches.
Difficulties arise, however, with creating a new conceptualization of
pregnancy. First, the concurrent nature of fetal and maternal life sug-
gests that pregnancy is an absolutely unique condition.'9g Creating
''special" legal frameworks for women suggests that women are in
need of accommodation. Any accommodation in turn bears the risk
of perpetuating stereotypes of women as weak and marginal in com-
parison to men.193 Recognizing this need, however, may be a way to
188. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that a fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
189. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 53 (1993); see also Rich, supra note 1, at 64
(stating that the child a mother carries can neither be described as the mother or not
the mother).
190. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 57.
191. Alberto v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Ctr., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1993, at 22
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
192. See id.; see also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1, 22-23(1985) (arguing that pregnancy is a unique
condition, but other than the time in which a woman is exercising her reproduction
capacity, women and men are equal). The conclusion that pregnancy is a truly unique
condition elicits the ongoing equal treatment/special treatment debate. Feminists have
clashed over the implications of treating women "differently" from men because of
their reproductive capabilities which perpetuates stereotypes of women needing spe-
cial assistance in the law. An adequate discussion of this topic would go beyond the
reasonable scope of this paper. For further insight into the problem, see generally
Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 326 (1984-85) (characteriz-
ing the debate as centering on whether pregnancy "naturally" makes women unequal
and whether women require special legislative accommodation).
193. See discussion supra note 192.
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make our "differences" positive and valuable, not marginal.1 94 Sec-
ond, a conceptualization of pregnancy that recognizes the value of a
potential life must be reconciled with constitutional guarantees of the
right to choose to have an abortion. Justice Glen attempts to confront
this dilemma by arguing that pregnancy "belongs" to the woman, as a
part of her body, in the sense that she owns it and may choose to
terminate it.'95 Only when a mother has chosen to become a mother,
and be subject to prenatal care, can she state a cause of action for
emotional distress arising from the loss of the fetus, based on both her
physical pain and her emotional loss.
Providing an alternative conceptualization of pregnancy such as Jus-
tice Glen's may also confront traditional cultural and legal under-
standings of fetal life. For example, the fetus has traditionally been
accorded an independent status from its mother. From the nineteenth
century, the fetus has been defined as life because of its capacity for
growth, which was deemed to imbue it with its own "embryonic au-
tonomy.' 1 96 Not surprisingly, this view of fetal life did not reflect wo-
men's common understanding of pregnancy, but reflected arguments
put forth by men. As Reva Siegel noted, "[tihe arguments doctors
brought to bear against the practice of abortion defined life from the
perspective of medical science.'197 In addition:
[The early doctors] arguments against abortion emphasized that the
fertilized egg had a physiological capacity for growth, and derived
from this capacity for growth the embryo's status as an autonomous
life form. Thus, in defending the claim that life begins at concep-
tion, physicians redefined the maternal/fetal relation, offering a
physiological account of human development that treated women's
role in reproduction as a matter of minor consequence-from the
point of conception onwards.' 98
194. As Martha Minow notes:
"[D]ifference" depends on a relationship, a comparison between people with
reference to a norm .... Changing the ways we classify, evaluate, reward,
and punish may make the differences we had noticed less significant, irrele-
vant, or even a strength. The way things are is not the only way things could
be. By aligning ourselves with the "different" person, for example, we could
make difference mean something new; we could make all the difference.
Minow, supra note 179, at 377.
195. See id.; see also Kahn, supra note 147, at 824-825. ("Once pregnant with the
intention not to abort, a woman's duty to herself to act on her own behalf is secondary
if not totally subjugated to her duty to care for her fetus.").
196. Siegel, supra note 182, at 288. This understanding is exemplified by Barbara
Katz Rothman's classic analogy: "The fetus in utero has become a metaphor for
'man' in space, floating free, attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But
where is the mother in the metaphor? She has become an empty space." Barbara
Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of
Motherhood 114 (1986).
197. Siegel, supra note 181, at 287.
198. Id. at 288.
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This entrenched physiological account of pregnancy is reflected in
the courts' analyses of emotional distress cases. Women's roles in the
reproductive process, both in terms of their physical burdens and
emotional attachments, are rarely the subject of the court's scrutiny.
Despite these obstacles to creating a new understanding of preg-
nancy, redefining the status of the fetus by focusing on the mother's
pregnancy has practical merits for the law. By understanding that
pregnancy is a dual process of both the fetus' growth and the mother's
expectation, courts can shift their focus away from determining
whether a fetus is or is not a person. The focus, rather than on the
fetus and its rights, would be on the pregnancy as a condition of the
mother. Moreover, courts have already implicitly recognized this ex-
pectational aspect of pregnancy. For example, the distinction courts
have found between duty in the prenatal and the abortion contexts
reflects this understanding. 199 Courts have acknowledged that they
recognize the expectation that life will occur in the prenatal context by
assessing duty in terms of mother and fetus. Similarly, courts have
recognized that when there is no expectation that the fetus will be-
come a life, such as in the abortion context, legal analysis focuses
solely on the mother's rights. A fetus does not gain status, therefore,
until we expect it to be born.
With this conceptualization of pregnancy in mind, however, a
mother also faces the task of meeting the legal requirements of emo-
tional distress recovery. In this way, courts can keep recovery within
manageable bounds and avoid opening the floodgates of litigation.
For instance, she must then show that her emotional injury is sufficient
to warrant recovery and that the doctor owed her a duty of care.2
This new understanding of pregnancy, however, will impact how
courts analyze the mother's harm and the duty the doctor extends. A
comprehensive critique of emotional distress in prenatal malpractice,
therefore, must recognize that the problems associated with this spe-
cific area of the law also reflect the inability of the existing tort doc-
trines to cope with this particular situation.
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Redefining Old Rules
In addition to the conceptual difficulties of defining pregnancy
within the law, courts have also been faced with the problem of how
to fit these types of cases into the existing legal frameworks for emo-
tional distress. This task is made more difficult because the prevailing
theoretical frameworks were not formulated to cope with these situa-
tions. Historically, there are two paradigm cases of emotionally-based
physical injuries brought by female plaintiffs: the pregnant plaintiff
who suffers a miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of being frightened,
199. See supra part II.C.
200. See discussion supra parts III.A.2 & III.C.
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and the mother who undergoes nervous shock when she witnesses her
child's injury or death."3 These claims were classified in the law as
emotional harms' and from that point the familiar frameworks of
emotional distress recovery developed.
Somewhere amidst these paradigm cases, however, are the cases
that involve prenatal malpractice. The fetal death and injury cases are
not quite like the miscarriage cases because the latter are in the medi-
cal context.2°3 Nor are they like the cases where the mother witnesses
an injury to her child, because here the child has not yet been born.
As a result, the prenatal malpractice cases create a new scenario that
is assessed by tests and frameworks that were not designed for it. In
addition to redefining pregnancy, therefore, courts must also alter ex-
isting conceptions of harm and duty in the special circumstances of
prenatal malpractice.
C. Feminism and Tort Law: A Reconsideration of Vahes
Feminist scholars argue that the past development and current un-
derstanding of tort law are infused with notions of gender roles and
stereotypes that reflect patriarchal norms.'3 Within the general scope
of tort law, feminists have focused on specific concepts such as harm
and duty as areas for feminist reform. In the narrower context of pre-
natal malpractice, courts must consider how to evaluate the unique
form of emotional suffering that women suffer when their children are
stillborn or birth defected, and how to reconsider the duty extended
by the physician to account for the treatment received by both the
mother and the fetus. At the same time, any changes in how we char-
acterize these concepts must be balanced against the competing claims
201. Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 23, at 814.
202. Id
203. The early fright-based miscarriage cases involved pregnant women who under-
went some trauma that induced a stillbirth. Se eg., Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coul-
tas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888) (pregnant plaintiff nearly hit by negligently operated
train causes her to miscarry her fetus).
204. For example, intraspousal and intrafamilial tort immunities shrouded domestic
violence against women and children from legal redress. These doctrines precluded
women and children from asserting claims against abusive husbands and fathers be-
cause of historical beliefs that men owned and controlled their women and children.
See Primer, supra note 3, at 6; see generally Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in
America, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 359, 478 (1989) (arguing that the demise of interspousal tort
immunity reflects changing social roles of women, but may not significantly improve
their condition within the family). In addition, gender roles are exemplified by the
classic tort principle of reasonableness. Reasonableness is premised currently on the
"reasonable man standard" which is the care required of a reasonably prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances. Feminists argue that this standard is not
gender neutral as existing doctrine teaches us and no universal standard can apply to
all people at all times. Primer, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that "[n]ot only does 'rea-
sonable person' still mean 'reasonable man'- 'reason' and 'reasonableness' are
gendered concepts").
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of the medical profession to keep malpractice insurance premiums at
205a minimum.
1. Understanding Harm
In contemporary tort doctrine, harm is valued in a hierarchical man-
ner in which individual physical integrity and property are valued
more highly than emotional security and human relational ties.206
This privileging of pecuniary injuries over lasting emotional scars is
closely related to valuations made in the law of damages.2°7 Because
tort law values damages based on the market economy, feminists ar-
gue that women's injuries are undervalued. °8 As a consequence,
male norms set the values of damages, and thus women are
undercompensated. °9
This undervaluation of emotional harm reflects continued gender
bias in the legal system.210 The concept of injury and harm is skewed
to reflect male conceptions of pain and suffering. For example, wo-
men's complaints of pain or injury were dismissed historically as emo-
tional or hysterical, whereas male complaints of the same ailment
were more likely to be treated as serious physical harm. 11 The domi-
nant standard for determining "normal" emotional responses, there-
fore, are male. 2  As a result, women become stereotyped as
emotional, 1 3 which detracts legitimacy from their emotional injuries,
and they are accordingly undercompensated within tort law.
205. The medical profession has also voiced extensive criticisms of the tort system
because of the "tort crisis" in medical malpractice. From the doctor's perspective,
flaws in tort law and its application by the courts have caused medical malpractice
claims to inflate malpractice insurance premiums to intolerable levels. See F. Patrick
Hubbard, The Physician's Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociolog-
ical Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform", 23 Ga. L. Rev. 295,296
(1989). A common critique of malpractice law is that courts have made recovery
much easier by changing the methods of proving malpractice through the use of ex-
pert testimony, by heightening the standard of care physician's must satisfy, and in-
creasing the information requirements doctors must offer for informed consent. See
id. at 310-11.
206. Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 23, at 814.
207. Torts Course, supra note 7, at 51.
208. Id. at 52; see also Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and
Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 73, 104 (1994) (arguing that the use of race and gender data for the
assessment of wrongful death damages constitutes unlawful state action for purposes
of Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny).
209. Primer, supra note 3, at 6.
210. See id. at 6-7.
211. Torts Course, supra note 7, at 65.
212. See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 23, at 832-33.
213. Professor Carl Tobias reviewed the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz casebook for
examples of gender bias and revealed that "nearly all the cases included in the notes
introducing historical material on the independent cause of action for emotional dis-
tress involved females who appear gullible, stupid, or weak, thus reaffirming notions
of women's inferiority." Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and
Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 495, 505 (1988).
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Professor Lucinda Finley highlighted this phenomenon in the con-
text of Payton v. Abbott Labs,214 a leading DES case."' 5 Professor
Finley notes that the case is usually invoked for the proposition that
trivial emotional distress should not be compensated because it is not
a serious enough injury and it is very easy for plaintiffs to feign dis-
tress.216 From the woman's perspective, however, the injury appears
different. Professor Finley urges us to consider the feelings of a wo-
man whose reproductive system has been harmed in a way that she
may not be able to have children, in a society in which women's sense
of identity and role is tied to their ability to become mothers. ' 7 In
this context, the emotional experiences start to look more like real
injuries and less like frivolous emotional claims."'
By analogy, the emotional injury that women suffer from the loss or
injury'to the fetus within them may seem more genuine and less frivo-
lous from the woman's perspective. Understanding and evaluating
emotional harm in these circumstances must reflect the conceptualiza-
tion of pregnancy as a process or condition.1 9 When a fetus is still-
born or injured, the emotional harm the mother suffers stems not
simply from the biological harm, but from the social and relational
costs associated with that loss. Integrating feminist values in relation-
ships and connection, therefore, will add value to these claims where it
has been missing.
Embracing these goals for understanding emotional harm may con-
front practical critiques. For instance, although critics recognize that
emotional distress can be extreme, they argue that large awards for
this harm should be limited because of the vagueness of intangible
damages, the unpredictability of the form and extent of emotional
harm, and the fact that monetary awards for intangible losses do not
really compensate the victim accurately.2 0
The inability to place a monetary value on such harm is a primary
concern of the courts.22' As one court noted, "calculation of damages
for plaintiffs' emotional injuries remains too speculative to permit re-
covery notwithstanding the breach of a duty flowing from defendants
themselves."'  In circumstances of prenatal malpractice, however,
this argument fails. First, mental suffering is no more difficult to esti-
mate in financial terms, and is no less a real injury, than "physical"
214. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
215. DES cases are briefly described supra note 168.
216. Torts Course, supra note 7, at 68.
217. Id.
218. Id. Professor Finley also noted that women exposed to DES often suffer in-
tense anxiety and anger or guilt in their relationships with their mothers and husbands
that require professional counseling. Id.
219. See supra part III.A.2.
220. See Hubbard, supra, note 206, at 318.
221. Id. at 360.
222. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978).
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pain.2" Second, it would be unjust to deny all relief to the injured
party simply because the wrong is of a nature with uncertain
damages.224
To give substance to the theoretical aspirations of understanding
harm to women, women's emotional injury should be given a legal/
market valuation that will mainstream the injury, thus making it seem
less remote and more legitimate.2  In particular, Professors Chamal-
las and Kerber urge the expansion of emotional recovery because it
will allow relational interests in emotion and connection to be viewed
as essential to one's integrity, on an equal level with physical and
property security.226 In addition, they argue that this expanded notion
of physical harm to include the emotional will account for the physical
and social experience of pregnancy. 227 Moreover, valuing emotional
harm in these circumstances will not contravene existing policy ratio-
nales for limiting emotional recovery. 228 For instance, the mental
trauma of losing a child, regardless of whether the death occurred the
day before or the day after birth, is likely to be long-lasting and ex-
tremely severe. Furthermore, fetal death or injury cases do not suffer
from the same suspicion of falsity and lack of genuineness that other
situations may face.2 29
In assessing claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
the context of prenatal malpractice, therefore, courts should recognize
that the mother's emotional injury is real and is deserving of a market
valuation. Furthermore, this harm must be measured in a way that
accounts for the social and biological aspects of pregnancy. Thus, the
interplay of how courts conceptualize pregnancy and how they value
the harm that results when that pregnancy is injured is critical to re-
shaping emotional distress law. This interplay is also crucial to under-
standing the concept of the duty of care a physician extends to
pregnant patients.
2. Duty Re-Evaluated
Redefining harm and pregnancy are not the only aspects to recon-
sider in searching to find equitable solutions for mothers. Courts must
also concentrate on ways to reconceptualize the limited concept of
duty in cases that involve pregnancy. Currently, courts have been
overly cautious in imposing a duty on a defendant, and have only done
so in a dichotomous way by recognizing duty towards either mother or
223. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 360 ("The law is not for the protec-
tion of the physically sound alone.").
224. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 815 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
225. See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 23, at 862.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
229. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 54, at 361.
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fetus.3 By shifting the focus away from determining to whom the
duty runs, courts can avoid this difficult analysis and redefine the stan-
dard of care itself.
In traditional legal doctrine, duty arises only in three limited ways:
when the defendant assumes it; when the law imposes it; or when it
arises from a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 31
Currently, a duty may be defined as an obligation, to which the law
will give recognition and effect, to conform to a certain standard of
conduct toward another.?3 z Seldom, however, do courts in emotional
distress cases confront the content of the duty of care. Rather, they
have directed their analyses at the mother and fetus, and to whom the
duty is owed.
Feminist jurisprudence offers two ways to resolve this problem.
First, understanding pregnancy as a condition of the mother that en-
compasses a "potential" life will refocus duty analysis away from de-
termining where the duty runs. Instead of according the fetus an
independent status from its mother, courts should treat the mother
and fetus as a biological, emotional and social unit when they receive
prenatal care. Second, courts can alter the content of the physician's
duty as well, taking into account relational norms of responsibility and
caring.
Feminist legal theorists suggest that the current standard of respon-
sibility is a pretext for the male view of autonomy and individuality. 3
How we define legal responsibility, therefore, should include feminist
understandings of responsibility and interconnectedness? 431 In femi-
nist terms, duty should be redefined to incorporate a "standard of
caring" or "standard of consideration of another's safety and inter-
ests."" 5 This relational notion of duty, feminists argue, will serve to
encourage and improve social relations, rather than enforcing our di-
visions, disparities of power and isolation. 6 On a practical level, this
would be to acknowledge the doctor's duty of care to the mother and
the fetus within her. In turn, this encourages doctors to appreciate the
maternal/fetal connection.
The practical objection to this formulation is the expansion of liabil-
ity in an era when tort reform and limitation is an important issue. To
adopt a theory of "interconnectedness" when assessing duty, as critics
assert, would "remove all limits on negligent infliction of emotional
230. See discussion supra part II.
231. See Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
232. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 25, § 53, at 356.
233. See Primer, supra note 3, at 31-32.
234. Overview, supra note 13, at 583.
235. Primer, supra note 3, at 31.
236. Id
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distress and expose all negligence defendants to limitless liability. ''23 7
In the specific context of pregnancy, however, this unwanted and lim-
itless expansion is not present. Understanding the connection be-
tween mother and fetus and that the duty a doctor owes during
prenatal care runs to both the mother and the child inside her is
neither remote nor unpredictable. It recognizes not simply an emo-
tional tie and concern for others, but a demonstrable biological condi-
tion. Thus policy arguments against redefining duty in the prenatal
context are not persuasive.
CONCLUSION
The development of the law of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress is intrinsically tied to changing societal views of women's roles
and the understanding of the fetus.3 s Because the law continues to
understand pregnancy through a masculine perspective, which tends
to separate the identities of mother and fetus, women's emotional in-juries have been undervalued. Any improvement in this situation nec-
essarily begins with reconceptualizing the maternal/fetal relationship.
By focusing on the woman's pregnancy, rather than the fetus' status,
courts may begin to reassess the extent and severity of emotional
harm women suffer, and the duty their physician's owe them. Most
importantly, implementing these conceptual changes will serve to
bridge the gap between feminist theory and legal practice, allowing
women to move closer towards equality through the "redistributive
mechanism of tort liability." 9
237. Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 369,
393 (1992).
238. See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 23, at 823.
239. Id. at 861.
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